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I
INTRODUCTION
We think the District Court [in declining to award fees] incorrectly focused its attention on
the outcome and practical effect of the litigation, to the exclusion of a more relevant consid-
eration-whether the suit was the type that Congress intended to encourage when it
enacted the citizen-suit provision . . . The attorneys' fee feature was offered as an
inducement to citizen suits, which Congress deemed necessary; and if the hope Congress
had for such suits is to become a reality, decisions on fee-allowance cannot make wholesale
substitutions of hindsight for the legitimate expectation of citizen plaintiffs.'
The court in Metropohtan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia
thus reasoned that the "public interest" aspect of a lawsuit filed to prevent air
pollution was sufficient to justify an award of fees based on the attorney fee provi-
sion of the statute under which the suit had been brought, despite the fact that the
plaintiffs did not prevail on the substantive issues in the case. 2 Although the
Supreme Court subsequently decided in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club 3 that a court may
not award fees when a plaintiff loses on all issues,4 the Court's rationale leaves little
comfort for those who are justifiably concerned that decisions like Metropo'ti'an
Washington Coalition are examples of an endemic problem in recent federal legisla-
tion: permitting the federal judiciary to decide "policy" and to interfere in the
daily operations of the executive branch. The Supreme Court's decision that the
plaintiffs were precluded from recovering attorney fees because they did not pre-
vail on any issue creates an insubstantial and ineffective obstacle to fee awards
against the federal government.
Attorney fee shifting is the process of allocating the cost of services provided by
attorneys among the parties to a lawsuit. Traditionally, parties pay their own
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attorney fees in the United States.5 In the past twenty years, however, Congress
has enacted numerous statutes which change the traditional approach by author-
izing "citizen suits." Briefly stated, citizen suits are statutorily created causes of
action brought by private individuals or groups, who need not have suffered per-
sonal harm, against federal agencies challenging the proposed or actual implemen-
tation of an administrative policy on the basis of its alleged inconsistency with
authorizing legislation. These statutes all permit potential recovery of attorney
fees and contain similarly phrased fee shifting provisions. 6 The typical statutory
provision provides that "[i]n any judicial proceeding under this section, the court
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) whenever it determines that such award is appropriate."'7
These attorney fee shifting schemes, establishing a low threshold for a private
party's entitlement to fees, have far-reaching consequences for our government
and its efficient operation. This article does not analyze statutes that permit fee
shifting in other actions against the government or among private parties.8
Accordingly, all types of civil rights actions, constitutional torts, and section 1927
awards of fees (awarded in cases of vexatious litigation and charged against the
vexatious litigant's counsel) are not addressed. 9 The limited inquiry chosen here is
5. Not long ago, the Supreme Court recognized that "[i]n the United States, the prevailing litigant is
ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorney's fee from the loser." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). The origins of this rule precluding fee awards to the prevailing
party lie in the common law. Id. See also Leubsdorf, Toward a Hz'tog of the Amertcan Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9.
6. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1982); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 154 0(g)(4) (1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (Supp. V 1981);
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c) (Supp. V 1981); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)( 4 ) (1976);
Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d) (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1976);
Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 491 l(d) (1976); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d)
(1976); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d) (Supp. V 1981); Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(d) (Supp. V 1981); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1976);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607() (Supp. V 1981); Air Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 622(e)(2)
(Supp. V 1981); Energy Sources Development Act 42 U.S.C. § 5851(e)(2) (Supp. V 1981); Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
7. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(o (Supp. V 1981) (commonly referred to as section 307(f)). The
Supreme Court held in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983), that the interpretation of
section 307(o controls the construction of the sixteen other statutes cited in note 6, supra. Id at 3276 n. 1.
8. This article will not examine, for example such fee shifting provisions as § 304 of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (Supp. V 1981), which permits actions against private parties for violations of the Act
and against the federal government for its failure to enforce existing regulations.
Other statutes that permit attorney fee shifting between private parties are also excluded from the
analysis. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976) (permitting attorney fees to be
awarded to successful plaintiffs). In total, there are more than 150 federal fee shifting provisions. Ruckel-
shaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3276 (1983).
9. Whether a distinction should be drawn between citizen suit attorney fee shifting provisions and fee
provisions in other statutory schemes is unclear. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983), the
Supreme Court permitted an award of fees to a party that did not succeed on every claim under a standard
which permitted fee awards only to prevailing parties. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981). The
determination could be interpreted to mean that statutes permitting awards only to prevailing parties and
statutes permitting awards when "appropriate," as in the case of citizen suits, are indistinguishable, espe-
cially in light of Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983). This conclusion does not, however,
appear to be correct.
The Court in Ruckelshaus discussed the traditional American rule embodied in Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), and then contrasted the operation of fee shifting schemes.
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for the purpose of uncovering the unique problems presented by fee shifting in
citizen suits. The implications of attorney fee shifting provisions in citizen-suit
legislation are far broader than the simple allocation of the costs of litigation. Cit-
izen suits and their concomitant fee provisions empower the courts to decide the
merits of challenges to administrative determinations and to award attorney fees
and other litigation expenses when the circumstances are deemed "appropriate."
When a court awards fees in a citizen suit, unlike other types of litigation, the
impact of the award extends well beyond the parties to the case. Because potential
citizen-suit plaintiffs ordinarily have not incurred any direct personal injury, the
strongest incentive to sue is the attractive likelihood of recovering litigation
expenses. As a result, awards in earlier citizen suits, through fee shifting precedent,
often determine whether or to what extent subsequent suits will be initiated.
Citizen suits clog court dockets, slow the administrative process, shift policy-
making to the judiciary, and undermine the very foundation of the American liti-
gation scheme.10 These adverse consequences of citizen-suit attorney fee shifting
necessarily debilitate the judicial system and blur the lines between the coordinate
branches of government. More specifically, citizen-suit fee shifting obviously
encourages people to sue the federal government because of the litigation incentive
provided by the potential recovery of attorney fees and the lack of any major cost
disincentive arising from such litigation because the fee shifting is effectively only
one-way-from the government/defendant to the plaintiff."t Because of frequent
Ruckelshaus, 103 S. Ct. at 3276-77 (1983). The Court then specifically described the operation of fee
shifting in citizen suits: "[W]e believe that the term 'appropriate' modifies but does not completely reject
the traditional rule that a fee claimant must 'prevail' before it may recover attorneys' fees." Id. at 3277.
Despite the unfortunate word choice of "traditional" to describe other fee shifting schemes, given that the
traditional rules do not permit fee shifting, the Court left open the possibility that different standards
might apply to citizen suits and other statutes allowing fee shifting, regardless of the fact that Hensley could
be interpreted otherwise.
10. The author's research has revealed no studies regarding what the specific effects of citizen suit
legislation with generous fee shifting provisions are on the administrative process. But it is simply beyond
dispute that the award of attorney fees to private litigants bringing citizen suits in the name of the public
interest will drastically increase litigation against federal administrative agencies. Indeed, this is the
declared congressional purpose behind these fee statutes. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89,
reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 626-27 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. It is also
equally clear that as federal agencies become increasingly threatened by private citizen suits they will
require greater study and reflection before taking any action that may produce such costly suits. The end
result will be a collective regulatory reticence that seriously debilitates and slows the already delay-prone
administrative process.
Equally significant, and no less distressing, is the obvious shifting of policymaking from agency experts
to judicial dilettantes in the various areas of agency expertise. The numerous fee shifting provisions found
in citizen-suit statutes uniformly grant the courts complete discretion to award litigation costs to citizen-
suit plaintiffs with only the amorphous notion of bad faith as their guide. Id Liberal awards of fees will
increase litigation and thwart agency action. Conservative fee awards will have the opposite result. In
either event, the courts will be indirectly affecting, and in some cases determining, the course of agency
action.
Finally, no rule is more deeply embedded in our jurisprudence than the principle that each party is
responsible for its own attorney fees. See Ayeska, 421 U.S. at 247. The rule is so fundamental that the
judiciary cannot "jettison . . . [it] whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular
statute important enough to warrant the [fee] award." Id at 263. Citizen-suit fee shifting provisions are
manifestly contrary to this paramount principle of litigation.
11. One reason that fees are shifted in only one direction is that Congress has not been clear as to the
appropriateness of fee awards to the government. Although some of the seventeen statutes cited in note 6,
supra, use the language "to any party," none incorporates the language "including the Federal Govern-
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fee shifting, many plaintiffs' attorneys are likely to encourage citizen suit litigation
beyond what is socially optimal in pursuit of government-provided attorney fees
that may be obtained even when the citizen is not the prevailing party. 12
The second fundamental problem of citizen suit fee shifting is that it substan-
tially impedes the administrative process. Challenges to government policy, both a
goal and a result of fee shifting legislation, 13 delay the administrative process and
reduce its efficiency. These challenges appreciably chill the administration of gov-
ernment by deterring administrators from experimenting with new ideas and inno-
vative techniques. As the administrative process is slowed, the costs of
implementation increase in real terms (at least in inflationary times) and substan-
tial benefits are lost due to delay. Once lost, the benefits that would have resulted
from an earlier implementation of the administrative action cannot be regained.
Finally, the lack of articulated legislative standards in citizen-suit statutes
regarding the appropriateness of fee shifting tranfers policymaking from Congress
to the courts. Although enabling legislation often delegates some discretion to
administrative agencies (in general terms rather than delineating the particular
areas in which citizen suits are available), such a legislative choice with respect to
fee shifting leaves far too much policymaking discretion to the judiciary-the
nonpolitical branch of government. Consequently, unelected and therefore politi-
cally unaccountable judges are required to make important policy choices
regarding the appropriateness of fee shifting in each case and also to decide
without invitation the validity of agency action or inaction at issue in citizen suits.
Due to the generalized nature of harms alleged in citizen suits, and the concomi-
tant drastic alteration in standing requirements, courts are increasingly required to
give, in effect, advisory opinions because parties often intervene before any actual
harm has occurred. Thus, the courts regularly make consequential policy decisions
when the potential harm is purely speculative.
In an attampt to alleviate many of the troubling consequences flowing from
ment," a variation found in the Ship Pollution Prevention Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1910(d) (Supp. V 1981).
Notwithstanding that the Ship Pollution Act does not permit citizen suits, the premise for the provision in
this Act is the same as that of the statutes permitting citizen suits: parties who come into court may be
awarded their attorney fees. The general similarity of the language and legislative history of the Ship
Pollution Act and citizen-suit statutes may lead courts to interpret the appropriateness of awards under
any of these acts differently depending on slight differences in language. For an implicit suggestion that
such similar language contained in different types of statutes will be analyzed comparatively, see United
States v. M/V Zoe Colocotroni, 602 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1979) (admiralty case). The First Circuit in M/V
Zoe discussed generally the appropriateness of fee awards to the federal government. The court stated:
"Absent specific and express authorization by statute, the United States may not recover its [attorney] fees
... " Id The court in also discussed Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136
(D.R.I. 1977), a citizen-suit case, which gave a narrow construction to who may recover attorney fees. Id.
Thus, judicial interpretation supports the proposition that fee awards will be shifted only in one direction.
Concededly it is not yet clear whether all courts adhere to this position; however, a review of the relevant
reported authority does not reveal any cases in which fees were awarded to the government.
12. Attorney fee shifting leads to "mercenary attorneys"-lawyers who make a practice of handling
suits with the potential for recovery of attorney fees. These attorneys encourage potential plaintiffs to
pursue marginal claims which would otherwise remain unlitigated.
13. The accepted legislative purpose behind citizen suit fee shifting is "to encourage litigation which
will assure proper implementation and administration" of the various remedial statutes under which
attorney fee shifting is authorized to further the public interest. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
337, repnnedrn 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1416 [hereinafter cited as House Report].
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attorney fee shifting legislation, this article suggests a model attorney fee statute.
Assuming Congress is unwilling to abandon citizen suits, this model is a practical
and moderate alternative to existing citizen suit legislation.
If citizen suits are to continue, they should be required to provide at least one
articulable benefit to the public welfare. In the context of administrative agencies,
the public interest is served by the disclosure of new information, the discovery of a
previously unconsidered important interest, or the demonstration that a govern-
ment agency has neglected to fulfill its nondiscretionary duties. Other challenges
begin to enter the realm of properly delegated discretion and often are no more
than another attempt to influence policy, this time, however, through the efforts of
the judiciary which cannot and should not formulate regulatory policy. The
model statute represents an attempt to further the above goals and is thus pre-
mised on the belief that citizen suits should provide a tangible benefit to the public
good before the suing citizen is compensated. Although the statute is most appro-
priately included in the third section of this article on judicial policymaking, it
serves as a helpful background when considering the impact of citizen suits on the
courts and administrative agencies. Unfortunately, even this moderate approach
cannot eliminate the inherent deficiencies of a system which relieves the litigant of
the responsibility for the costs of his own litigation. With all this in mind, it is first
necessary to examine closely the legislative purpose behind citizen suit-fee shifting.
Without understanding the congressional reasons underlying established fee
shifting provisions, it is impossible to analyze and weigh the benefits and costs
inherent in the one-way fee shifting employed in citizen suits. Once the purpose of
permitting fee shifting in citizen suits is clear, the deficiencies and disturbing con-
sequences of relieving litigants of their attorney fees become manifest. It is clear
that Congress correctly recognized that administrative agencies cannot be left
completely unchecked and unwatched if agency regulation is always to further the
public interest. Fee shifting is not, however, the proper remedy. Simply put,
citizen-suit fee shifting against government regulatory agencies is a "solution" that
is far worse than the problem it purportedly solves.
II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE
With respect to citizen-suit attorney fee shifting, it has been observed that
"[n]either legislative history nor case law offers interpretations of the statutory
requirement that costs be granted only 'in an appropriate case.' "14 There is, nev-
ertheless, some legislative history that ostensibly reveals the principal reasons for
citizen-suit legislation and their concomitant attorney fee shifting provisions. In
establishing citizen suits under the Surface Mining Act, 15 Congress expressly rec-
ognized that
[t]he success or failure of a national coal surface mining regulation program will depend, to
a significant extent, on the role played by citizens in the regulatory process. . . . While
14. Carpenter v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Del. 1980).
15. Surface Mining Control and Regulation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (Supp. V 1981).
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citizen participation is not, and cannot be, a substitute for governmental authority, citizen
involvement in all phases of the regulatory scheme will help insure that the decisions and
actions of the regulatory authority are grounded upon complete and full information. In
addition, providing citizens access to administrative appellate procedures and the courts is
a practical and legitimate method of assuring the regulatory authority's compliance with
the requirements of the act. Thus in imposing several provisions [such as fee shifting] which
contemplate active citizen involvement, the committee is carrying out its conviction that
the participation of private citizens is a vital factor in the regulatory program as established
by the act. 16
Congress reasoned that because "citizens would be performing a public service" in
bringing suits against administrative agencies, "the courts should award costs of
litigation to such party."' 7 Congress was not reluctant to transfer considerable
regulatory policymaking discretion to the courts through citizen-suit legislation
because it legislatively presumed without proof that the "[e]nforcement of...
regulations is not a technical matter beyond the competence of the courts."' 8 Nor
was Congress concerned that fee shifting would increase the number of meritless
claims brought against federal agencies. This lack of concern resulted from the
Congressional assumption that "judges are quite capable of dismissing frivolous
suits early in the proceedings."' 9
On a more theoretical level, citizen-suit statutes were enacted by Congress to
achieve a more desirable, efficient, and ultimately a more socially beneficial alloca-
tion of societal resources. Under statutes which concern the pollution of our envi-
ronment and the conservation of our natural resources, for example, citizen suits
have, without exception, been authorized. 20 One reason for this is the economic
character of pollution, which in a competitive market economy is known as an
externality, a term generally defined as
a benefit or cost of a market transaction that is neither paid for nor received by those
making the transaction, and therefore is not incorporated into the market demand or
supply curve. If, for example, a manufacturing plant emits smoke that pollutes a town and
causes its citizens to get lung cancer, there is a social cost of the operations of the firm that
will not be felt by the firm and will not influence its price or quantity supplied.
2 1
Externalities are market imperfections that can be justifiably remedied through
government intervention. 22 That is why Congress has enacted so many antipollu-
tion and conservation statutes. These statutes attempt to achieve the socially
optimum allocation of resources by weighing the quantifiable economic benefits of
pollution-producing activities against the damage to human health and the envi-
ronment caused by pollution and excessive resource exploitation.
To administer and enforce these remedial statutes, Congress has created
numerous federal regulatory agencies. Citizen-suit statutes and their attorney fee
shifting provisions represent an implicit congressional recognition that these agen-
cies are not immune from error or bias. Under these statutes, rather than relying
16. House Report, supra note 10, at 625.
17. 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3744, 3747.
18. Id
19. House Report, supra note 10, at 627.
20. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 6.
21. E. GRAMLICH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 19 (1981).
22. Id
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on federal attorneys general, an unbiased watchdog committee, or some other
mechanism of ensuring the appropriateness of agency action, Congress has pro-
vided that citizens become "private attorneys general" and "agency watchdogs.
23
It is thus clear that Congress had legitimate economic concerns in mind when it
enacted citizen-suit fee shifting provisions. The more difficult question, however,
is whether fee shifting is a desirable and appropriate mechanism to control agency
regulation and thereby to help to achieve the substantive policy goals under the
major antipollution and conservation statutes.24
III
CRITIZING CITIZEN-SUIT ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING
A. Litigious Litigants
The American tradition of litigation dictates that each party should bear its
own litigation costs, including attorney fees. 25 Consequently, in the absence of
specific statutory authorization, contract, or extraordinary circumstances, the
"American rule" requires that a party pay his own attorney fees, even if he
prevails. 2 6 The traditional approach requires that a party considering litigation
evaluate the risk of unsuccessful litigation and estimate the costs associated with it
when computing the net benefit of further pursuing its claim. This salutary
cost/benefit analysis by potential litigants helps prevent improvident, unnecessary,
and often costly litigation. It also greatly reduces the pursuit of unfounded or
frivolous claims.
Accepting the existence of some fee shifting, an alternative more acceptable
than the one way shifts of the current citizen suit scheme is two-way fee shifting.
This is an option which the system under consideration manifestly ignores. Under
the present fee shifting system, when fees are awarded they are given almost invari-
ably to the private litigant. The courts have indicated that the government is
entitled to receive its litigation costs only if a private plaintiff brings a completely
frivolous suit.27 Thus, the courts exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the inherent
deficiencies of fee shifting, encouraging parties plaintiff to litigate by presenting
the appealing prospect of receiving a fee award, and the highly unlikely possibility
of a penalty in the form of fees assessed.2 8
23. Carpenter v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Del. 1980).
24. Of course, this question necessarily subsumes the proposition that attorney fee shifting may in
some circumstances be an appropriate mechanism to accomplish substantive policy goals. Although the
author is unwilling to accept this questionable proposition, extended discussion of this far more philosoph-
ically perplexing question must be left to another article.
25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
26. Id
27. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 410, 421 (1978) (fees awarded, in the court's
discretion, to defendant in civil rights action, if plaintiffs action was frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad
faith); see also supra note 8. Courts discuss the premise of fee shifting as encouragingprvateparties to enforce
provisions of federal acts and moving the government towards one goal or another. See, e.g., Save Our
Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (D.R.I. 1977) ("The possibility of such fees
serves as an incentive for private parties to enforce provisions of various statutes deemed too important to
be left to the limited enforcement resources of the Justice Department.").
28. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce intended that the statute permit the
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An additional problem of fee shifting arises when certain beneficiaries of the
citizen suits employ them for personal gain. Because fees are not awarded on the
basis of the ability to pay,2 9 wealthy plaintiffs and plaintiffs with a pecuniary
interest in the outcome 30 may file a citizen suit even though they could otherwise
easily afford to undertake such litigation. These wealthy plaintiffs, often environ-
mental or other interest groups advocating their position on an issue, are able to
increase immensely the amount of litigation they undertake because the govern-
ment effectively "subsidizes" their suits.
Attorney fee shifting in citizen suits encourages individuals or groups with
nearly frivolous or only marginally colorable claims to challenge the implementa-
tion of government policies in court. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Ruckel-
shaus v. Szerra Club3i precluded an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs only when
they fail to prevail on any issue: "[w]e hold that, absent some degree of success on
the merits by the claimant, it is not 'appropriate' for a federal court to award
attorneys fees .... "32 Thus, the possibility remains that a party might be suc-
cessful on only one claim among many and still recover attorney fees. 33 The pri-
mary consequence of this rule is that the award of attorney fees may turn solely on
the skill of counsel, thereby favoring those plaintiffs whose attorneys are able to
win on a relatively unimportant subsidiary issue, even though failing on the merits
of the case as a whole. Once the plaintiff prevails on a single issue, it may be
argued that the interests brought out in the course of litigation exemplify the type
of citizen participation Congress intended to encourage and reward when it estab-
lished fee shifting. 34
Unlike the American rule, the current citizen-suit attorney fee structure pro-
vides potential plaintiffs few disincentives to litigate. The prospect that plaintiffs
will have to pay attorney fees is so remote that few parties would even briefly
consider it. To the extent that these suits are litigated in the "public interest," it
appears that a court will be reluctant to assess fees against a plaintiff without spe-
cific congressional direction. The end result is the troublesome "floodgates"
award of attorney fees even when the plaintiff was not the prevailing party. House Report, supra note 13,
at 1416. See also Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1145 (D.R.I. 1977) (the
awarding of fees to plaintiffs who prevail in citizen suits is the general rule and not the exception).
29. The economic position of plaintiffs is considered irrelevant with respect to the award of attorney
fees under citizen suits. Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1146 n. 15 (D.R.I.
1977). To be sure, "[t]here is no indication that Congress meant to limit . ..[awards of attorney fees] to
public interest groups nor is there any basis for disqualifying a party from receiving an award merely
because that party is solvent and has a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation." Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
30. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1982).
31. 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
32. Id. at 3281 (emphasis added).
33. For a discussion of the appropriateness of awarding fees to "partially prevailing parties," see id at
3279.
34. See, e.g., Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs lost on all
issues and fees were not awarded, but total loss on issues presented not considered determinative regarding
the fee award); Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 670 F.2d 847, 848 (9th Cir. 1982). Surprisingly
enough, the plaintiff need not prevail on any issue so long as "the case presented novel, complex, and
manifestly unclear questions concerning the interrelationships" between the governing Acts. North Slope
Borough v. Andrus, 507 F. Supp. 106, 108 (D.D.C. 1981).
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problem-a host of suits filed to challenge administrative rulings because of the
"no-lose" proposition presented to plaintiffs under citizen-suit statutes. The
problem is currently most acute in the environmental area because legislation on
this subject has been a focal point of activist groups during the Reagan Adminis-
tration. The environmental situation highlights the fact that groups no longer in
power, in this case the environmentalists, are likely to challenge government action
in the courts where their present political powerlessness does not prevent them
from pursuing and perhaps achieving their policy objectives. The prospect of
recovering attorney fees further encourages these groups to resort to the courts.
The short-circuiting of the administrative process resulting from court chal-
lenges to duly enacted administrative schemes is explored in more depth in the
next section. For now, suffice it to say that such activities by groups out of power
represent a clear circumvention of the political decisionmaking process. It is dis-
turbing to realize that wealthy special interest groups often use the courts as a
vehicle to evade the political process altogether by continually challenging admin-
istrative determinations under citizen-suit legislation. In addition, by encouraging
lawsuits the entire process threatens to overwhelm already overcrowded court
dockets. 35 The likelihood of increased litigation grows as administrations more
closely aligned with one end or the other of the political spectrum are elected.
Even though not all citizen suits are brought because of statutory fee shifting pro-
visions, the existence of such provisions only encourages, as intended by the legisla-
tive drafters, 36 the filing of such lawsuits. In authorizing citizen suits, Congress
either ignored or simply failed to recognize the serious consequences of citizen-suit
legislation for the courts, the administrative process, and society as a whole.
B. Unadministrable Administrative Agencies
The legislative branch legislates and the executive branch implements. This
unsophisticated axiom of our government is common knowledge. But since the
early days of our Republic a profound change has occurred inasmuch as executive
branch action, through its administrative agencies, effectively "legislates" in many
areas in which Congress chooses to grant agencies broad authority without specific
standards for its use. Administrative rulemaking has evolved to approximate many
of the functions of Congress. More recently, a new twist to an old story is evident
in the form of citizen-suit statutes in which Congress, by encouraging such suits
through pro-plaintiff fee shifting, effectively leaves to the courts the task of imple-
menting congressional policy.
This recent shift in the responsibility for implementing congressional policy
threatens the administrative process with the impairment of experimentation and
35. The following examples of attempts to expedite court dockets reflect a growing concern that
courts are backlogged. Eg., 2D CIR. R. 34(g) note (determination by court not to hear oral argument);
4TH CIR. R. 7(b) (disposition of appeal without oral argument), 18 (unpublished opinions). See also Nes-
nite, Manageria/Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1982); Remarks of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., ABA Divi-
sion of Judicial Administration, San Francisco (August 9, 1982).
36. See, e.g., Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (D.R.I. 1977).
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the prospect of substantial delay insofar as any individual may file suit to chal-
lenge an agency decision. 37 The administrative agencies, which are the subject of
the seventeen statutes cited at the beginning of this article, 38 face a number of
formidable tasks in implementing the directives of Congress. The agencies must
not only interpret legislative intent, but also consider a number of special interests,
including industrial and environmental lobbies which attempt to persuade the
agency that their interpretation is closest to the actual intent of Congress. An
example helps to illustrate the tremendous difficulty encountered by federal agen-
cies in carrying out the legislative commands of the various antipollution and con-
servation statutes under which citizen-suit fee shifting is typically permitted. The
1977 Clean Air Amendments required the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate
[N]ot later than one year after the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments . . . a national
primary ambient air quality standard for NO 2 concentrations over a period of not more
than 3 hours unless, based on the criteria issued under section 108(c) [42 U.S.C. § 7408(c)]
he finds that there is no significant evidence that such a standard for such a period is requi-
site to protect public health."
'3 9
The broad discretion granted the Administrator of the EPA enables him to
balance a variety of interests, reach a workable solution to a complex problem, and
yet remain within the specific bounds of the applicable enabling legislation. Con-
gress purposely left to the discretion of the Administrator the task of interpreting
the congressional mandate because of his perceived experience and expertise. Cit-
izen suits can easily distort this mandate by providing an opportunity for judicial
interference where such meddlesomeness is unlikely to result in a solution appreci-
ably better than its administrative predecessor. 40
A subsidiary, but equally important, result of statutes that authorize citizen
interference in the administration of government is the chilling of administrative
agency experimentation. As the Supreme Court noted long ago, the science of
government is the science of experiment. 4 1 Congress wisely leaves substantial dis-
cretion with the agencies to permit and encourage the fashioning of programs and
remedies which effectuate legislative purposes, while taking into account the prac-
tical implications and costs of alternative methods.42 One example of this flexi-
bility is the EPA's "bubble concept" for air pollution emissions control. This
37. See, e.g., Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (costly six month delay in
leasing of land to develop energy resources was not justified by the apparent insignificance of alleged
public benefits from citizen suit challenge); Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Train, 373 F.
Supp. 991, 995 (D. Cal. 1974) (exacerbation of energy crisis due to economic impact and delays caused by
energy plant shutdown not justified by potential benefits of citizen-suit challenge).
38. See supra note 6.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(c) (1982). The implementation of this standard could have been challenged
under section 307(o of the Clean Air Act, one of the seventeen statutes that are the focus of this article.
40. A wealth of literature exists criticizing the inability of courts to understand and competently ana-
lyze complex technical matters on a regular basis. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (comments of Judge Bazelon on the danger of having scientific data
reviewed by "technically illiterate judges").
41. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 209, 226 (1821).
42. See, e.g., Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (one purpose of the
statute was to expedite development of energy resources). See also Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found.,
454 U.S. 151, 154 (1981) (Secretary of Interior given discretion to try experimental bidding systems for
offshore oil leases).
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policy alternative balances increases in emissions from new or modified equipment
with corresponding decreases in emissions from other equipment at the same plant
so long as the total emissions from the plant remain within specified levels. 4 3 Per-
mitting citizen suits where the complexity of a problem requires unencumbered
experimentation tends to discourage agencies from taking new approaches such as
the bubble concept, which although unconventional may best achieve the long
term objectives of Congress. The present system far too easily permits adjudicative
attacks on this experimentation, leading to the almost certain prospect that agen-
cies will simply take the path of least resistance to avoid judicial admonition. 44
Conflict between agency enabling legislation and suit provisions creates an
uncertainty regarding the proper role of citizen suits. There is no guarantee that
the interests of an individual in bringing a citizen suit will be any more consonant
with the policy underlying agency enabling legislation than those of many large
corporations which are most often the object of antipollution and conservation
regulation. It may be cogently argued that citizen suits were only intended for
extreme circumstances. These rare and extraordinary circumstances would gener-
ally be limited to cases in which an administrative agency significantly and inex-
plicably deviated from its congressional mandate. Otherwise, citizen suits could be
constantly used to impede the daily operations of administrative agencies, causing
additional costs borne by the public. Surely this could not have been the intention
of Congress when it enacted the citizen-suit provisions. Village ofKakiovlk v. Watt 45
provides an example of litigation which added little substance to the interpretation
or implementation of the underlying statute and was extremely costly with respect
to general litigation expenses, lost licensing fees, and delay to the government.
46
Even though the court in Kaktovik found that the litigation created an "adverse
impact on our national security and economy, ' ' 4 7 the court declared that the
citizen-suit provisions required the award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs if they
prevailed on any issue. 48 An interpretation of citizen-suit provisions which limits
litigation to cases of outrageous abuses of administrative authority would strike a
more desirable balance between effective administrative decisionmaking and pur-
poseful citizen participation.
While it is conceded that the administrative system contemplates a certain
amount of judicial oversight of agency actions, the substantial increase in judicial
oversight created by the existing citizen-suit statutes and their corresponding fee
shifting provisions weakens the entire administrative process. As agencies concern
43. See 41 Fed. Reg. 16,280 (1981).
44. See PanelIV-Judicial Review of Agency Action, 26 AD. L. REV. 545, 553 (1974), remarks of Kenneth
Cox, Institute of Federal Agencies and the Public Interest, ABA Section of Administrative Law (proposi-
tion that agencies become more cautious contributing to a variety of problems including increased delay).
45. 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
46. The government determined, for example, that the cost of delay in Kaktovik was at least $15
million in lost interest on lease payments delayed. Id at 226. For analogous examples in the area of
private-party litigation, see J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 96 (1981); Porter, The Need for Fnahty
On the Administrative Process: Problems in Li'censing Nuclear Power Facilities, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25, 110
(1981).
47. 689 F.2d at 226 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
48. Id
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themselves with looking over their shoulders to see how judges will act, agency
authority will be unavoidably diminished because their decisions will have no
sense of finality. In turn, judges will be forced to assert authority in fields in which
they have little or no expertise, education, and experience.4 9 Judges must not only
ensure that the requisite procedures have been followed-a traditional judicial
role-but also interpret the applicable substantive law and thereby displace the
primary function of the agencies. Accordingly, the administrative responsibility
shifts to these inexperienced judges who must decipher what Congress meant in a
political and technical sense by a given statutory scheme in the context of a spe-
cific set of adjudicative facts.
Increased judicial oversight has been fueled by the fee shifting provisions of
citizen-suit legislation. Parties are encouraged, indeed actually "paid," to come
into court and upset the administrative machinery because the possibility of a pen-
alty (in fees assessed) is effectively nonexistent, whereas the probability that the
government will involuntarily finance the lawsuit is extremely high so long as the
litigation is perceived as a "public benefit" of implementation or interpretation. 50
Unknowledgeable judges will have unlimited opportunities to impede the imple-
mentation of salutary administrative policies and procedures, resulting in unneces-
sary delay, 5' enormous costs, 5 2 and administrative agency atrophy.
53
C. Economic Inefficiency Under Citizen Suit Attorney Fee Shifting
The application of basic economic theory to citizen-suit attorney fee shifting
reveals that such a statutory departure from the American rule for the payment of
attorney fees inevitably results in an inefficient allocation of societal resources. In
seeking to remedy the problems of agency error and bias, Congress has created a
"solution" in the form of citizen suit fee shifting that is more harmful than the
problems it attempts to eliminate. Citizen-suit fee shifting represents no more
than another instance of congressional overcorrection. Upon close inspection, it
appears that a legislative gash was made by Congress where only a delicately exe-
cuted surgeon's incision was needed.
An economic analysis of citizen-suit fee shifting must begin with a review of
general microeconomic principles. First, the government must require pollution
49. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (benzene expo-
sure standards); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (OSHA lead exposure
standards); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Clean Air Act standards); BASF
Wyandotte v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir. 1979) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
50. Florida Power & Light v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1982).
51. See, e.g., Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (unsuccessful citizen-suit
challenge resulted in a six-month delay in the lease sale of the Alaska Continental Shelf); see also Note, The
Judicial Role In Defimig Procedural Requirements for Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REv. 784, 785 (1974).
52. See, e.g., Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1982), where the government
estimated that the six-month delay caused by an unsuccessful citizen-suit challenge to its proposed lease of
the Alaska Continental Shelf resulted in direct costs to the government in excess of $15,000,000 and indi-
rect ripple effect costs to the economy as a whole approaching $60,000,000.
53. On the consequences ofjudicial excess, Chief Justice Burger has warned that "[w]hen the political
institutions are not forced to exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers,
like muscles, tend to atrophy." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 253 (1982) (dissenting opinion); see also A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 21 (1962).
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producing firms to pay for the costs of their harm to the environment to achieve a
socially optimum allocation of resources. 54 Although the collective cost to society
of pollution is high, the cost of pollution borne by each individual is not sufficient
to induce individual action against polluters. Second, it is axiomatic that in a
market economy individuals act to further their own personal pecuniary inter-
ests. 55 Finally, it should not be overlooked that "the governmental administrative
machine is not itself costless," '56 and that despite good intentions "direct govern-
mental regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem
to be solved by the market or the firm." '5 7
Litigation is not a costless activity. Thus, a party will pursue litigation in the
absence of subsidy (the American rule) only when the perceived benefits exceed
the predicted costs and associated risk attendant to a particular claim. Citizen-suit
fee shifting effectively makes private actions against federal agencies costless except
on those rare occasions when the courts refuse to award fees because the public
benefit was not in any way furthered by the lawsuit. Fee shifting removes the most
substantial constraint on litigation-attorney fees. The inescapable result is a
costly and unrestrained growth in litigation against federal agencies. It is quite
easy, no doubt, to conceive of hypothetical situations in which an absurd award of
fees might be made because the public interest was marginally benefited, despite
the enormous direct and consequential costs of the litigation. One need not, how-
ever, resort to legal imagination to find such instances. In Village of Kaktovik v.
Watt, 58 for example, the concern of various environmentalists over the possible
adverse impact on whales from the sale of the Alaska Continental Shelf delayed
the sale for six months. The cost of this delay was estimated to exceed
$75,000,000. 5 9 Although the court refused to award fees to the plaintiffs, such an
award was sought and apparently expected. 60 The prospect of an award of
attorney fees provided by the applicable citizen suit fee shifting provision was a
substantial, if not an overriding, inducement to the plaintiffs in Kaktovik to bring
suit against the government. In causation terms, "but for" the propsect of attorney
fees the plaintiffs in Kaktovik probably would not have brought suit. Few individ-
uals except the most ardent of whale lovers would seriously contend that the
Kaktovik citizen suit was an appropriate, desirable, or efficient allocation of societal
resources. Even fewer individuals would argue that an award of attorney fees in
54. One economist has explained that pollution requires government intervention to achieve market
efficiency
[blecause important environmental costs are not covered in the resource-use charges, [and therefore]
the market economy's adjustment, in terms of both least firm cost and broader 'public interest' objec-
tives, falls short of the ideal . . . . If there were a price penalty for polluting, the costs of abatement
would be imposed upon the production process and adjustments would be made in resource use.
L. HINES, ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs 226 (1973). See also E. GRAMLICH, supra note 21, at 19-20.
55. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 345 (London, 1893).
56. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in MICROECONOMICS, SELECTED READINGS 368 (E. Mansfield
ed. 1971).
57. Id
58. 689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
59. Id at 226.
60. Id at 228.
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Kakovik was justified regardless of whether the plaintiffs in that suit prevailed on
any issue, especially if they failed to prevail on the predominant issue in the case.
There remains a second major economic criticism of citizen-suit fee shifting
that cannot be ignored. Congress mistakenly presumed that private citizens will
always or usually base the decision to bring a citizen suit on whether the public
interest is thereby furthered. Such economic altruism is unlikely to be found in the
typical citizen-suit plaintiff. For it is no less true now than it was over two hundred
years ago that, as the great market economist Adam Smith then declared, "every
individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how
much he is promoting it. . . . [H]e intends only his own gain. ' 61 Concededly, the
public interest and the interest of the citizen-suit plaintiff may occasionally be
coextensive, but this relationship is more likely a product of chance than necessity.
The result of a national referendum regarding the decision to bring a particular
citizen suit would probably, more often than not, differ from the decision made by
an individual or interest group minority. But because of the likelihood of an
award of fees these individuals will bring citizen suits irrespective of whether the
public interest is actually and substantially furthered. 62
Fundamentally, citizen-suit fee shifting is economically unsound. Routine fee
awards lead to an excessive amount of litigation against federal agencies. And the
private interests of individual citizen-suit plaintiffs have no necessary or demon-
strated nexus with the public interest.
D. Judicial Policymaking
1. The Ubiquit'ousJudctagy. Citizen-suit statutes and their associated fee shifting
provisions remove the principal disincentives to suits against federal agencies and
thus impede the administration of government. 63 Although direct, these conse-
quences may not, however, be the most deleterious.6 4 Ultimately, citizen-suit stat-
utes authorizing attorney fee awards that provide litigation incentives shift
policymaking from the legislative and executive brances of government to the
unelected and politically unaccountable judicial branch. These statutes accom-
plish this shift by relaxing historically self-imposed prudential limitations on the
federal judiciary, by leaving crucial statutory terms undefined, and by failing to
provide the courts with standards they can apply. Such a transfer of policymaking
from the legislature to the judiciary "raises the justifiable concern that important
61. A. SMITH, supra note 55, at 345. Admittedly, Adam Smith meant by this remark that the each
individual acting in pursuit of his own personal gain would, through the "invisible hand" of the market,
further the public interest by assisting society in reaching an efficient allocation of resources. Id. But the
market situation of which Adam Smith so eloquently spoke has been destroyed by citizen-suit fee shifting
legislation. The market for litigation exists only where the American rule prevails. Fee shifting destroys
this natural market by removing the cost-of-litigation restraint for one party.
62. In determining whether to award fees to a citizen-suit plaintiff the courts have articulated the
requirement that the suit further the public interest in some way. Carpenter v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 976,
979 (D. Del. 1980). As a practical matter, however, the public interest threshold requirement for an award
of fees is easily satisfied. Seldom will a nonfrivolous citizen suit against a federal agency fail to at least
slightly further the public interest. An award of fees is thus the rule rather than the exception. Whether
the public interest is actually and substantially furthered by a citizen suit is, however, a far different question.
63. See supra note ll and accompanying text.
64. Note, supra note 51, at 805.
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policy decisions will be made by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, '6 5 rather than by
elected representatives. And once the precedent for countermajoritarian judicial
policymaking is firmly established, its breadth cannot be easily limited.
2. Justiciabiity Limitations on the Federal Courts. Inherent in citizen suit statutes are
many of the same evils that the federal courts attempt to prevent through self-
executed justiciability limitations. Historically, the courts have adhered to the con-
stitutional mandate that they decide only "cases or controversies" 66 by requiring
that the issues presented in a suit be "justiciable." The concept of justiciability
embodies two relevant elements. 67 First, standing to sue requires that the com-
plaining party must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining, a
direct injury as a result of the acts or omissions of the defendant. 6 Second, the
separation of powers and prudential concerns preclude the courts from adjudi-
cating cases that are judicially defined as "political questions. '69
Citizen-suit statutes extend justiciability to its farthest limits by relaxing, if not
completely removing, the requirement of standing. These statutes greatly expand
the number of potential plaintiffs who may initiate an action from those having
suffered personal harm-the traditional standard-to any citizen, regardless of
whether he has incurred a direct personal injury. Consequently, the courts are
presented with general theoretical allegations, rather than the specific, concrete,
triable issues that an injured plaintiff normally provides in the pleadings.
The authorization of citizen suits against government agencies also expands
traditional notions of justiciability by encouraging the courts to decide cases
which, although not labelled as such, fit squarely within the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of political questions. 70 Both the substantive determination in a citizen suit
and the fee award decision involve "a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards" and "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent reso-
lution [of such issues] without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government. ' ' 7 1 Citizen-suit legislation requires the courts to entertain
challenges to administrative processes and determinations which they routinely
refuse to decide under the Supreme Court's established political question criteria
for determining when to subject a statute or regulation to minimal judicial scru-
tiny in deference to the executive and legislative branches. For example, in Sierra
65. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958).
66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
67. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974).
68. Valley Forge Christian Academy v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
69. A political question is one which involves
A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969).
70. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
71. Id
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Club v. Costle, 72 one of the original decisions giving rise to Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, 73 the court in a voluminous opinion concluded, after reevaluating each step
performed by the EPA in promulgating new emissions standards for coal burning
power plants, that the EPA had properly construed its congressional mandate.
Although the court remarked that it had "on close questions given the agency the
benefit of the doubt out of deference for the terrible complexity of the job,' 74 the
decision clearly revealed that the court had in fact extended no such deference.
The many important and difficult-to-balance policy concerns addressed in the
EPA's new standards were subjected to judicial scrutiny, thereby seriously sacri-
ficing the values underlying the fundamental premise of our system of govern-
ment-that policy choices should be made by politically accountable
representatives. 75 Because these challenges often involve policy choices, the courts
necessarily decide issues which are resolved more appropriately by a politically
sensitive branch of government. 76
Citizen-suit statutes enlarge the justiciability boundaries of federal courts by
disregarding these limitations on judicial power. But in so doing, the statutes also
disregard the important purposes behind standing and the political question doc-
trine. The underlying element of these justiciability concerns is the recognition
that by restricting the judicial power to actual disputes in which the parties have
real and personal stakes, justiciability not only conserves judicial resources but also
prevents the courts from providing "remedies" for every social or economic griev-
ance. 77 To the extent that citizen-suit statutes and attorney fee shifting legislation
encourage adjudication of these controversies, they plainly encourage judicial
policymaking.
3. The Courts'Abi/ity to Adjudicate Citizen Complatnts. The courts are ill-equipped to
decide the types of issues which routinely arise when citizens challenge administra-
tive agency determinations and procedures. To begin with, the extremely over-
loaded dockets of most federal courts 78 prevent judges from spending the time
necessary to understand an agency determination that probably required months
or even years to make. Problems caused by time and other resource constraints are
compounded by the lack of judicial expertise in the technical matters involved. 79
72. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
73. 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
74. Id. at 410.
75. It is fundamental that the courts may not "substitute their own pleasure to the . . . intentions of
the legislature." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 507 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
76. The Supreme Court has recognized that "judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97
(1978). See also Berger, Commentaiy-"The Supreme Court As A Legislature" A Dissent, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
988, 993 (1979).
77. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic ill." Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 253 (1982) (Berger, C.J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
78. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
79. It seems obvious that "the legislature is ... a better fact-finding body than an appellate court"
insofar as "the typical legislature will command wider knowledge and keener appreciation of current social
and economic conditions than will the typical court." Cox, The Role of Congress In Constitutional Determina-
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Admittedly, federal judges are expected to be generalists capable of educating
themselves in concepts and theories foreign to them; nonetheless, the number and
complexity of considerations relevant to administrative fact finding and decision-
making in the fields in which citizen suits are available render these problems and
their administrative solutions uniquely inappropriate for judicial reevaluation.80
Exacerbating the difficulties inherent in judicial review of an agency determi-
nation is the distinctive characteristic of citizen suits-plaintiffs need not assert
any personal injury resulting from the challenged determination. Thus, the court
must focus not on any discrete and comprehensible relationship between the plain-
tiff and the defendant, but rather on the long range and far reaching implications
of an often unimplemented governmental choice. In short, not only does the court
review an agency determination that has often taken years to make, and not only
must the court assimilate information that is highly specialized and complex, but
it must also do so in a context practically devoid of the particularity and concrete-
ness that a plaintiff who suffers actual loss brings to court. Even one with abun-
dant faith in the federal judiciary should be reluctant to tax its abilities and
resources so severely. The burden on the courts is increased by the award of
attorney fees which fosters litigation by providing previously unavailable financial
incentives for private litigants to challenge administrative actions.
4. Pohtical Accountability. A less obvious reason that the courts are ill-suited as
ultimate arbiters of administrative determinations is the lack of political accounta-
bility in life-tenured federal judges. The Constitution incorporates norms of self-
government which entrust the development, evaluation, and implementation of
national public policy to the elected branches of government. 8' One major benefit
of this entrustment is the responsiveness of public policy to electoral influence.
Popular elections enable the electorate to insist on desired changes in policy by
voting for candidates sympathetic to their views, thereby making officials attentive
to voter sentiments between elections. The power to influence public policy
increases citizen participation in the electoral process, encourages citizens to edu-
cate themselves about policy issues, and enhances the legitimacy of government in
the eyes of the people. To the extent public policy is forged in litigation by
unelected federal judges with lifetime tenure, these foremost democratic values are
thwarted.8 2 Neither history nor policy provides an adequate justification for the
impairment of these democratic principles upon which our government is
premised.
Rather than the mere administration of a legislative mandate, federal agency
rules and procedures, regularly challenged in citizen suits subsidized by attorney
fee awards, are precisely those policy issues for which our constitutional system
assigns responsibility to the politically accountable branches of government. Chal-
lenges to administrative determinations demand solutions far beyond the scope of
tions, U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 209 (1971). This observation is even truer with respect to federal administrative
agencies and their presumed regulatory and scientific expertise.
80. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888).
81. U.S. CONST. arts. I & II.
82. See L. HAND, supra note 65; J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901).
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the judicial function which has historically been limited to the application of statu-
tory and common law to particular factual situations.
Administrative agencies must frequently balance competing policy objectives.
In promulgating rules, regulations, and standards, agencies do not simply imple-
ment existing public policy, but rather develop solutions which account for these
disparate objectives, based on the agencies' experience and expertise. Illustrative
of the many multifaceted issues which require administrative solutions are what
levels of sulphur dioxide emissions we are willing to tolerate in the air8 3 and how
much of the Alaska continental shelf should be leased or sold to private companies
in order to exploit domestic oil and gas resources.84 At the risk of redundancy, it is
apparent that citizen-suit and attorney fee provisions shift responsibility for these
important policy choices from the administrative agencies, which were legislatively
created to make such choices, to the courts, which were not.85 These provisions
thus promote, indeed compel, judicial policymaking.
5. Judicial Discretion. Even if the public is willing to accept the negative results of
citizen suits in order to allow litigants to enforce particular statutory schemes, it
does not follow that the enormous amount of judicial discretion created by the
standardless, open-ended statutes now in force must also be accepted. 86 Because
the courts have been given few statutory guidelines with respect to the circum-
stances under which parties should be awarded costs, judges encourage.or dis-
courage particular types of litigation based on their personal policy predilections.
In failing to formulate standards the courts can apply, Congress has forced the
courts to "play legislature in [their] 'interpretations' of the statute."8 7
The cost shifting provisions of citizen-suit legislation 8 are typified by section
307(f) of the Clean Air Act.8 9 Congress amended an earlier version of the Clean
Air Act to permit courts to award fees and other costs when "appropriate." This
amendment instructed the courts to relax the standard for awards of costs from
that which was then being applied. The House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce stated: "The Committee did not intend that the court's discretion
to award fees under this provision should be restricted to cases in which the party
seeking fees was the 'prevailing party.' In fact such an amendment was expressly
83. EPA standards limiting the amount of sulfur dioxide emissions by coal burning power plants were
challenged in Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the original case that gave rise to the
attorney fees issue in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
84. The Secretary of the Interior's decision to sell outer continental shelf land was at issue in North
Slope Borough v. Anders, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
85. The core of judicial discretion is choice:
To say that a court has discretion in a given area of law is to say that it is not bound to decide the
question one way or the other. In this sense, the term suggests that there is no wrong answer to the
questions posed-at least there is offiall4y no wrong answer.
Rosenburg, Judcial Dzcretonofthe Trial Court-Vtewedfrom Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1971)
(emphasis in original).
86. "That system of law is best which confides as little as possible to the discretion of the judge .
B. SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 94 (1944) (quoting an old Latin proverb).
87. Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
88. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (Supp. V 1981).
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rejected by the Committee. . . ."9 But, even though Congress was explicit that
"appropriate" was not to be the equivalent of "prevailing," Congress completely
failed to define the term "appropriate." 9' Indeed, the term "appropriate," absent
further definition and some point of reference, necessitates a policy choice rather
than a judicial evaluation. As Professor Charles Black noted, the issue is
whether the materials available as foundations for judicial judgment contain . . . concepts
and terms so vague and ambiguous, so intractable to the normal intellectual processes
of law, that a congressional command to interpret them must be disobeyed on the Article
III ground that the judiciary has been commanded to perform a non-judicial func-
tion . . ... 92
The term "appropriate," as used in the cost shifting provisions of the Clean Air
Act and similar legislation, is precisely the kind of "vague and ambiguous" con-
cept Professor Black had in mind. The failure of Congress to establish standards to
guide the courts forces them to formulate their own standards. The courts not
only decide who must bear the costs of litigation, but in making decisions as to
costs, also promote particular kinds of challenges to administrative determinations.
In creating their own standards and thus influencing the kinds of challenges that
come before them, courts engage in public policymaking, which in Professor
Black's terminology is unmistakably a "non-judicial function." And the courts
have not remedied the vague command of those fee shifting provisions by inter-
preting the statutes in a manner which fetters judicial discretion. The Supreme
Court in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club93 minimally restricted judicial discretion to
award fees and other expenses in citizen suits by requiring only that plaintiffs suc-
ceed on at least one claim (among the many they have asserted) before they may
receive a fee award.94 The Court leaves open the prospect that a plaintiff could
receive his litigation expenses on the basis of his "success" on a minor part of his
case. Even after Ruckelshaus, governmental policy might be vindicated, and the
basic agency determination validated, but based on a relatively insignificant pro-
cedural deficiency, the government may nevertheless be required to pay the costs
of a challenge to its judicially sanctioned action.
The inimical combination of vague language and the absence of either clear
legislative guidelines or intent produces a situation in which federal judges have an
almost unlimited discretion to award fees according to their own policy proclivi-
ties. This discretion thrusts the courts into the forefront of policymaking in fields
where fee shifting is available. In this context, Chief Justice Marshall's well-known
declaration that it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is"'9 5 takes on an entirely new meaning.
§0. House Report, supra note 13, at 1416.
91. Although the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce cites National Resource
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973), for an interpretation of "appropriate"
similar to that intended by the Committee House Report, supra note 13, at 1416, it seems that the citation
is intended to support the Committee's rejection of "prevailing" as the sole criterion for fee awards. The
Report does not expressly adopt the standards applied in National Resource Defense Council, nor are these
standards particularly helpful.
92. C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 42-43 (1981).
93. 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983).
94. Id at 3281.
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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IV
ALTERNATIVES
What are the alternatives to existing citizen-suit statutes and their cost shifting
provisions? The first apparent alternative is to return to historical notions of jus-
ticiability. This approach would necessitate eliminating citizen suits per se,
although a general cause of action would remain for individuals suffering cogni-
zable injury. A return to traditional ideas would relieve the courts from resolving
direct personal disputes in which the complaining party has suffered no personal
loss or in which the "rights" or "duties" asserted are political rather than legal in
nature. Following this course would also entail a return to the American rule
which presumes that a sufficient incentive for litigation exists when there is an
expectation of success on the merits, while the probability of loss on the merits
deters frivolous or weak claims. Adherence to the rule would force potential liti-
gants to assess the value of their particular claims in contradistinction to the
present citizen-suit system which requires no individual stake in the outcome and
therefore no such assessment. Retaining these traditional concepts would greatly
reduce the delay and added expense caused by the unnecessary interference of
private litigants and federal judges in the administrative process. More impor-
tant, the traditional rules would reduce the opportunity for "lawmaking"
according to the politically unchecked policy views of a single judge.
Assuming Congress is unwilling to abandon citizen suits, it should revise and
improve the present fee shifting provisions by making three primary changes.
First, the provisions ought to require clearly that fee shifting be in fact two-way to
discourage trivial claims. More precisely, when the government prevails against a
private litigant, the government should receive its actual, reasonable litigation
expenses including attorney fees incurred in defending the suit. Conversely, when
the private litigant prevails he should receive his reasonable litigation expenses.
The terms "prevail" or "success" should be explicitly defined to guide the courts in
cases where both parties have prevailed to some degree. To accomplish the disin-
centive purpose of fee shifting, a party should not be able to recover its costs unless
it has prevailed on the predominant part of its case; the "prevailing" party should
be the litigant who has won more of the case than it has lost. Second, the various
provisions authorizing the award of costs in citizen suits should be phrased consist-
ently so that improper distinctions are not drawn from slightly different word
usage. Third, Congress should expressly identify the standards that courts are to
apply in awarding costs. In determining these standards, Congress should look at
the experiences courts have had with various approaches and decide whether these
approaches encourage the right kinds and prevent the wrong kinds of litigation. It
should be remembered, however, that these revisions, although representing an
improvement of the present citizen suit fee shifting scheme, are not preferred over
the complete elimination of such statutorily permitted attorney fee awards. The
following model statute illustrates the above recommended changes:
In any judicial proceeding under this section, [i.e., the substantive law containing the cit-
izen-suit provision] the court may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney
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and expert witness fees) to any party including the federal government upon a finding that
the following circumstances are present:
A. The party has substanttal
, 
prevailed, and
B. The party has sought to effectuate the purposes of this section by:
1. Supplying new and important information;
2. Raising a significant interest that was not considered in a legislative or administra-
tive forum;
3. Demonstrating the failure of governmental departments, agencies, or officials to ful-
fill nondiscretionary responsibilities delegated to them under this section; or
4. Demonstrating that challenged administrative procedures or determinations were
performed in violation of this section.
After Congress revises the cost shifting provisions, it should evaluate the appli-
cation of the new provisions as soon as there is sufficient information to make a
meaningful appraisal. Congress should determine whether the economic and
other policy objectives of fee shifting are being satisfactorily achieved. More specif-
ically, does the legislation encourage citizen enforcement of the statutory scheme?
Has two-way fee shifting deterred frivolous suits? To what extent have citizen
suits impeded the admininstrative process? The point here is that the precise con-
sequences of citizen-suit statutes are unknown, which necessitates an early evalua-
tion of the actual effects of suits authorized by the statutes.
V
CONCLUSION
In recent years it seems that political decisionmaking has become a task inge-
niously avoided with disturbing frequency by Congress. As a result of this trend,
Congress has increasingly abdicated a substantial part of its responsibility to the
other branches of government. The shift to the judicial branch means that deci-
sions once made through the political process are now adjudicated. What adjudi-
cative, as opposed to political, decisionmaking means, however, is that decisions
are made with a view to the interests of the few parties before the court rather than
society as a whole. Adjudicative decisionmaking also means that the deci-
sionmakers are not directly accountable to any constituency. When Congress
relinquishes responsibility for fundamental policy choices to the courts, govern-
ment not only becomes far less susceptible to popular influence, but also far more
vulnerable to the personal views of life-tenured federal judges. Awards of attorney
fees greatly increase policy-oriented litigation, thus affording unaccountable
judges greater opportunity to make decisions more appropriately made by elected
branches of government. Equally important, citizen suit fee shifting cannot be
justified under the basic economic principles of efficient resource allocation.
Genuine representative government cannot flourish when conventional
wisdom grudgingly insists that no government action is either lawful or legitimate
until approved by a federal judge. As President Lincoln eloquently warned:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court the
instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people
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will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
9 6
From the foregoing analysis, it is plain that the foundation of justification on
which citizen-suit fee shifting rests is unpersuasive and unsound. It is one thing for
Congress to allow, as it should and must, those substantially and adversely affected
by government decisionsto challenge them in court. It is quite another thing for
Congress deliberately to induce and reward litigious meddlesomeness by those who
simply do not like the results of our political and administrative processes (and
who could instead try to change the results through these same processes). As the
legislative history of citizen-suit fee shifting provisions strikingly reveals, the above
economic and structural criticisms of these misguided statutes have not previously
been considered by Congress.
96. THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 238 (D. Lott ed. 1961).
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